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National critical infrastructure and industrial processes are heavily 
reliant on automation, monitoring and control technologies, 
including the widely used Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The growing interconnection of 
these systems with corporate networks exposes them to cyber 
attacks, with several security incidents reported over the last few 
decades. This study provides a classification scheme for 
categorising security incidents related to critical infrastructure and 
industrial control systems. The classification scheme is applied to 
analyse 242 security incidents on critical infrastructure and 
industrial control networks, which were reported between 1982 
and 2014. The results show interesting patterns, with key points 
highlighted for the purpose of improving the way we plan for and 
direct efforts toward protecting critical infrastructure and 
industrial networks.   
CCS Concepts 
• Information systems applications ➝ Process control 
systems   • Security in hardware ➝ Hardware security 
implementation.  
Keywords 
SCADA; Critical infrastructure; Industrial control systems; Cyber 
security; Cyber attacks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern industrialised societies are fast becoming heavily 
dependent on automation and control. On the one hand, the large 
and complex network of highly interconnected infrastructure 
assets such as electricity grids, water distribution systems and 
transportation facilities must be adequately monitored and 
controlled in order to optimally serve their intended purpose of 
enabling the flow of goods and essential services within urban and 
regional settings [1]. On the other hand, the industrial processes 
that generate economic prosperity for the society must be 
supported with automation and control technologies in order to 
safely attain optimal desired outcomes [2]. Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems provide the needed 
monitoring and control capabilities for real-time operations of 
these critical infrastructures and industrial control networks [3]. 
Historically, SCADA systems have been designed to operate in 
standalone networks, completely insulated from the corporate 
network [3]. However, with growing competition and increased 
pressure to reduce cost and improve operational efficiency, the 
need to share information with corporate business units as well as 
perform maintenance routines remotely has resulted in widespread 
interconnections of SCADA systems with corporate networks that 
are remotely accessible through the internet [4]. This growing 
practice, in combination with progress in using standard 
networking protocols for SCADA communications, has resulted 
in increased exposure of national critical infrastructure and 
industrial control systems to cyber attacks [5]. Consequently, 
there have been several reports of security incidents on critical 
infrastructure and industrial control systems, many of which lead 
to significant loss from economic, public safety and 
environmental standpoints [3]. 
Understanding the various dimensions of these security incidents 
and  how they have evolved  over  time  can  indubitably provide 
insight for  developing  effective strategies  to  prevent or mitigate 
similar attacks in the future [5]. On this basis, Miller and Rowe 
[5] attempted to sample and classify past records of cyber attacks 
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems. They 
classified attacks based on source sectors, method of operation, 
impact, and target sectors [5]. While their study contributes 
significantly in helping to understand the nature of previous cyber 
attacks on SCADA systems, the range of options considered in 
their classification scheme and the limited number of incidents 
(15) surveyed limits the ability to gain deeper insight into trends 
and patterns related to previous security incidents [5].  
In the current study, an attempt is made to address this gap by 
presenting a more comprehensive analysis of previous security 
incidents on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems, 
both in terms of the range of options considered in classifying 
attacks and the number of incidents sampled. A total of 242 
reported security incidents on critical infrastructure and industrial 
control systems are surveyed and analysed based on a proposed 
classification scheme presented in the following methodology 
section.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
This study was carried out using publicly available data from the 
Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) online database 
[6]. The data set covers industrial security incidents reported to 
have affected process control, industrial automation or SCADA 
systems within the period of 1982 to 2014 [6]. The data set 
remains one of the richest so far for understanding historical 
accounts of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial 
control systems worldwide. At the time of this report, the database 
contains 242 security incidents related to critical infrastructure 
and industrial control systems,  most of which are confirmed to be 
correct. Attributes of the data include title, year, industry type, 
country/region, and a brief description of the incident, including 
its impact.  The entire data set was analysed in order to show 
patterns and highlight key points that can be useful for how we 
plan and direct efforts toward protecting critical infrastructure and 
industrial control systems (ICS).  
To ensure a structured analysis, incidents were classified 
according to the “intent”, “method of operation” and “perpetrator” 
of the attack. 
2.1 Intent  
This is the purpose for the attack as gleaned from the incident 
report. Based on the description of incidents, intent was classified 
into 7 categories namely theft, service disruption, unintended 
service disruption, sabotage, espionage, accident, and unknown. 
Theft: This is theft of computers and other sensitive information 
such as intellectual property, trade secrets and other financial 
assets. 
Service disruption: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the 
attacker is to cause disruption, including delay and shutdown of 
services. The motivation to cause service disruption varies and 
can sometimes be due to the desire to expose the degree of 
vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. Based on incidents 
reported, service disruption could last from a couple of hours to 
few weeks. 
Unintended service disruption: This covers incidents that results 
in accidental disruption to services. Based on incidents reported, 
unintended service disruption could also last from a couple of 
hours to few weeks. 
Sabotage: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the attacker 
is to deliberately cause damage to industrial control facilities or 
critical infrastructure networks.  
Espionage: This refers to attacks wherein the attacker, often state 
sponsored, sets out to spy and collect information for political and 
military advantages.  
Accident: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the attacker 
is to cause accidents within industrial or critical infrastructure 
networks.  
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the purpose was 
unknown.  
2.2 Method of operation  
Based on the classification of cyber attacks adopted in previous 
studies [7], [ 8], each reported incident was categorised into one 
of six methods of operation, namely malware, unathorised insider 
access, unathorised remote access,  interruption of  services, non-
cyber attack, and unknown.  
Malware: These are cyber-attacks that are carried out using 
malicious software. In order to infect the targeted network with 
malware, attackers often rely on the use of common techniques 
such as social engineering, phishing, and compromised removable 
media and personal laptops belonging to employees and vendors.   
Unathorised insider access: This is when an insider (e.g. 
employee, vendor or contractor) gains access to computer 
resources in the corporate or industrial control network without 
the required permission. This type of attack can be carried out 
through different means including stolen credential, misuse of 
privilege, brute-force, and backdoor exploits.  
Unathorised remote access: This is when an attacker remotely 
gains access to computer resources in the corporate or industrial 
control network without the required permission. This type of 
attack can also be carried out through stolen credential, brute-
force, social engineering, and backdoor exploits.  
Interruption of services: These types of attacks are aimed at 
interrupting or possibly shutting down essential services provided 
by industrial control systems and critical infrastructure networks. 
An example is denial-of-service attack, where the attacker aims to 
make the network unavailable [9]. Another example is jamming, 
where the radio frequencies that networked computers use for 
their wireless communication are interfered with [9].  
Non-cyber attack: In industrial control systems, component failure 
(e.g. programmable logic controller), software bugs and computer 
malfunction or glitches can potentially result in the shutdown of 
crucial services. Incidents of this type are referred to as non-cyber 
attacks in this study.   
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the mode of 
operation is unknown.  
2.3 Perpetrator 
Perpetrator refers to the alleged attacker responsible for the 
reported incident. In this study, perpetrators are categorised into 
lone hacker, organised hacking group, vendor, employee, 
unknown, and none.  
Lone hacker:  This includes any unaffiliated individual engaging 
in the cyber attack of critical infrastructure and industrial control 
systems on their own accord. Script kiddies, criminals and 
protesting members of the society often fall into this group.   
Organised hacking group: These are highly motivated and well 
funded hacking groups. Examples include terrorist groups, hostile 
governments,   
Vendor: This includes security vendors, suppliers and contractors.  
Employee: This refers to disgruntled or greedy employees who 
attack their own employer’s system.  
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the perpetrator is 
unknown. 
None: This covers non-cyber attacks presented above, i.e., 
situations in which no one has deliberately launched a cyber 
attack on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in this 
section. Table 1 shows the number of incidents reported for each 
country. Europe appears in the list because of two reports of 
attacks on European facilities in 2003. About 17 countries 
recorded just one reported security incident. Others recorded 
more, with the United States topping the list followed by the 
United Kingdom. One may quickly interpret these results to be 
that the United States and the United Kingdom are the most 
vulnerable to cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial 
control systems. However, given that the quality and 
completeness of records in the RISI repository are subject to 
people’s willingness to report security incidents, it could well be 
that the reason for the high level of incidents in the United States 
and the United Kingdom is because institutions are more open to 
share security incidents in these two countries or that the RISI 
data collection campaign is stronger in these countries. 
  Table 1. Number of reported incidents per country/region 
Country or region Reported incident 
Brazil, Chad, Germany, Guam, Guyana, 
Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, The 
Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela 
1 
France, India, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Europe 
2 






United Kingdom 32 
United States 123 
Figure 1 shows the number of reported incidents for different 
critical infrastructure networks and industry types. Transportation 
topped the list (48), followed by Power and Utilities (45), 
Petroleum (36) and Water/Waste Water (31) in that order. Mining 
(1) and Pharmaceutical (2) were the least impacted by security 
incidents. One reason for the high level of attacks on 
transportation systems could be because of the many avenues to 
perpetrate such attacks- from road network (e.g. road signs 
attacks) to rail and air traffic systems; the reliance on automation 
and control systems creates many avenues for cyber attacks. 
Secondly, the wide geographical distribution and the huge impact 
associated with their failures make them attractive to cyber 
attackers. Same is true for the Power and Utilities sector. It should 
be noted that based on reports in the data set, the industry type, 
“Other” is observed to include facilities such as roller coasters, 
amusement park rides, hospitals, emergency services, military, 
etc. 
 
Figure 1. Number of reported incidents per industry type 
 
The number of incidents reported for each year covered in the 
data set is shown in Figure 2. The highest number of security 
incident was recorded in 2003 (36), followed by 2009 (23), 2004 
(22), and 2012 (19) in that order. A closer observation of reports 
within the data set shows rise in malware attacks from 2000, 
which peaked in 2003. After 2003, reported incidents dropped 
steadily until 2008. The reason for the drop cannot be gleaned 
from the data set. 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of incidents per year 
 
3.1 Key observations from the results 
 The first reported security incident on industrial control 
systems was in 1982, in which a Siberian gas pipeline 
exploded as a result of a Trojan that doubled its usual 
pressure. Though some sources claim that the explosion is 
due to poor construction and not malware, this incident is 
still recognised in the literature as the first reported cyber 
security attack on industrial control systems [5].  
 More than half of all cyber attacks on critical infrastructure 
and industrial control systems (Figure 3) are aimed at 
causing service disruption. Attackers may adopt different 
methods of operation such as malware (e.g. worms, Trojans, 
viruses), unathorised access, and denial-of-service attacks in 
order to cause service disruption. Jamming (e.g. infrared and 
electromagnetic interference) also featured as a source of 
service disruption to critical infrastructure systems. Two 
reported cases of service disruption within the data set, i.e., 
the 14-year old school boy who hacked into Poland’s tram 
system in 2008 and the 1999 Shut down of SCADA Systems 
in San Diego’s water and energy facilities, involved the use 
of infrared remote control and electro mangnetic 
interference from a NAVY AN/SPS 49 radar operating off 
the coast of San Diego respectively.    
 An Attack on a given infrastructure or industrial control 
facility may originate from multiple sources, making the 
tasks of mitigation and attribution difficult. A recent 
example reported within the data set is the 2014 German 
Steel Mill cyber attack, wherein multiple attackers 
succeeded in causing massive damage by putting a furnace 
in an undefined condition, so that it could not be shut down 
in the regular fashion.   
 Many attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial control 
systems start by first gaining access to the corporate 
network before progressing to the control system 
network. This implies that while ICS and SCADA-specific 
security measures are crucial for the protection of critical 
infrastructure and industrial control systems, traditional 
approaches such as firewall, demilitarized zones, antivirus, 
intrusion detection and prevention, access control and 
authentication mechanisms must be put in place as the first 
set of security layers.  
 Unauthorised access can occur remotely or through an 
insider. The results (Figure 4) have shown that insiders pose 
a similar risk of unauthorised access (8.26%) as do remote 
cyber attackers (8.68%). Adequate security policies and 
control must therefore be put in place to prevent insiders 
such as employees, vendors and contractors from gaining 
unauthorised access to computer resources.   
 Figure 5 shows that approximately 66% of security incidents 
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems are 
caused by unknown perpetrators while 17% are not caused 
by a perpetrator. Security incidents that are not caused by a 
perpetrator are likely to be non-cyber attacks. Non-cyber 
attacks constitute approximately 33% of security incidents 
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems. 
Typical examples of factors observed to have resulted in 
non-cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial 
control systems include lightning strike, inappropriate 
security practices (e.g. installation of incompatible antivirus 
and software patches in SCADA systems, unintended 
consequences from penetration testing and IT audits, etc.), 
incorrect network configuration, and poor management 
practices (e.g. incorrect network configuration, poor 
maintenance and upgrade of aged software and hardware 
components resulting in system failure, inadequate staff 
training, incorrect programming of PLC controllers, etc.). 
These factors, amongst others, are also some of the reasons 
for the high record of unintended service disruption (18%) 
as shown in Fig 3. 
 Approximately 5% of security incidents on critical 
infrastructure and industrial control systems are established 
to be caused by organised hacking groups (Figure 5). Some 
well-known hacking groups allegedly named as responsible 
for some of the reported cyber attacks includes the Anti 
Christ Doom Squad, Comment Group, Cutting Sword of 
Justice, Dragonfly, and Sun Hacker.  
 Figure 4 shows that the method of operation for 
approximately 20% of security incidents on critical 
infrastructure and industrial control systems are unknown. 
This is a significant issue because the ability to protect 
systems from cyber attacks is degraded without adequate 
knowledge of the adversaries and their methods of 
operation.   
 Common vulnerabilities exploited in many of the incidents 
reported includes uninstalled or outdated antivirus, 
inadequate firewall protection, lax physical security, use of 
weak or default passwords, inadequate security policies, 
poorly management backdoors, loopholes in ICS and 
SCADA products, employees as weak links in the security 
chain (e.g. the use of social engineering as well as the 
introduction of malware into the corporate network though 
connected personal laptops and USB sticks), poorly secured 
VPN access and other known vulnerabilities that are often 
associated with web services and windows systems.  
 Some of the malware that have been successfully used 
against critical infrastructure and industrial control systems 
include Shamoon virus, Mariposa virus, Conficker virus, 
Stuxnet, PE_SALITY virus, W32.Virut.CF virus, Mytob 
worm, Ahack worm, Generic Backdoor.k Trojan, Zotob/PnP 
Worms, Spybot, W32/Korgo Worm, Sasser worm (rampant 
in 2004), Nachi/Welchia Worm, MUMU worm, Blaster 
virus (rampant in 2003), Nacchi virus, SQLslammer Worm, 
Sobig Virus, Nimda virus, Code Red Worm and the Remote 
Explorer. These malware, in addition to other SCADA-
specific malware such as Flame and Duqu should be 
monitored as potential threats against critical infrastructure 
and industrial control systems [5].  
 A total of 673 deaths were recorded while the number of 
injuries was well over 419. Most of the deadly incidents 
reported occurred in the transportation sector. One of such 
incidents is the 1997 Korean air line B747 CFIT accident 
that took 228 lives as a result of a bug introduced into the 
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system during a 
software upgrade. Another 228 passengers also died in the 
Air France flight 447 that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in 
2009 due to suspected computer failure. The Spanair flight 
5022 that crashed just after takeoff in 2008, killing 154 
people is believed to be caused by a Trojan. In Australia, a 
Qantas Airbus A330 flight that plunged suddenly after 
experiencing a computer glitch in 2008 resulted in the injury 
of 110 people. 
 
 














Cyber attacks on national critical infrastructure and industrial 
networks pose serious concern to modern societies. Understanding 
the evolution and the various dimensions of previous security 
incidents can help in developing effective strategies to prevent or 
mitigate similar attacks in the future. This study has presented a 
classification scheme for categorising security incidents related to 
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems. The 
usefulness of the classification scheme was demonstrated in 
analysing 242 security incidents on critical infrastructure and 
industrial control networks, all of which were reported between 
1982 and 2014. The results revealed interesting patterns, including 
the most affected countries, the most vulnerable industry, the most 
prevailing type of attack etc. Furthermore, key points were 
highlighted for the purpose of improving the way we plan for and 
direct efforts toward protecting critical infrastructure and 
industrial control systems. One limitation of this study is the fact 
that availability and access to a complete record of all security 
incidents on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems is 
difficult, particularly when the area of interest is the global 
domain. The study used the most comprehensive data available 
publicly, but acknowledges that the incidents included in the data 
set are not exhaustive, even within the period investigated. 
Security incidents that occurred after 2014 are also not covered. 
Future studies will therefore seek to address these issues, 
including means by which governments, industry, private sector, 
academia and citizens can better work together to realise the 
shared responsibility of securing critical infrastructure systems 
through improved availability and access to comprehensive and 
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